毛泽东:关于西藏平叛的讲话

发信人: gjq (who am i?), 信区: ChinaNews
标 题: 毛泽东:关于西藏平叛的讲话
发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Fri Mar 14 19:07:27 2008)

关于西藏平叛[1]

(一九五九年四月十五日)

　　有些人对于西藏寄予同情，但是他们只同情少数人，不同情多数人，一百个人里头
，同情几个人，就是那些叛乱分子，而不同情百分之九十几的人。在外国，有那么一些
人，他们对西藏就是只同情一两万人，顶多三四万人。西藏本部(只讲昌都、前藏、后
藏这三个区域)大概是一百二十万人。一百二十万人，用减法去掉几万人，还有一百一
十几万人，世界上有些人对他们不同情。我们则相反，我们同情这一百一十几万人，而
不同情那少数人。
　　那少数人是一些什么人呢?就是剥削、压迫分子。讲贵族，班禅[2]和阿沛[3]两位
也算贵族，但是贵族有两种，一种是进步的贵族，一种是反动的贵族，他们两位属于进
步的贵族。进步分子主张改革，旧制度不要了，舍掉它算了。旧制度不好，对西藏人民
不利，一不人兴，二不财旺。西藏地方大，现在人口太少了，要发展起来。这个事情，
我跟达赖[4]讲过。我说，你们要发展人口。我还说，你们的佛教，就是喇嘛教，我是
不信的，我赞成你们信。但是，有些规矩可不可以稍微改一下子?你们一百二十万人里
头，有八万喇嘛，这八万喇嘛是不生产的，一不生产物质，二不生产人。你看，就神职
人员来说，基督教是允许结婚的，回教是允许结婚的，天主教是不允许结婚的。西藏的
喇嘛也不能结婚，不生产人。同时，喇嘛要从事生产，搞农业，搞工业，这样才可以维
持长久。你们不是要天长地久、永远信佛教吗?我是不赞成永远信佛教，但是你们要信
，那有什么办法!我们是毫无办法的，信不信宗教，只能各人自己决定。
　　至于贵族，对那些站在进步方面主张改革的革命的贵族，以及还不那么革命、站在
中间动动摇摇但不站在反革命方面的中间派，我们采取什么态度呢?我个人的意见是:对
于他们的土地、他们的庄园，是不是可以用我们对待民族资产阶级的办法，即实行赎买
政策，使他们不吃亏。比如我们中央人民政府把他们的生活包下来，你横直剥削农奴也
是得到那么一点，中央政府也给你那么一点，你为什么一定要剥削农奴才舒服呢?
　　我看，西藏的农奴制度，就像我们春秋战国时代那个庄园制度，说奴隶不是奴隶，
说自由农民不是自由农民，是介乎这两者之间的一种农奴制度。贵族坐在农奴制度的火
山上是不稳固的，每天都觉得要地震，何不舍掉算了，不要那个农奴制度了，不要那个
庄园制度了，那一点土地不要了，送给农民。但是吃什么呢?我看，对革命的贵族，革
命的庄园主，还有中间派的贵族，中间派的庄园主，只要他不站在反革命那方面，就用
赎买政策。我跟大家商量一下，看是不是可以。现在是平叛，还谈不上改革，将来改革
的时候，凡是革命的贵族，以及中间派动动摇摇的，总而言之，只要是不站在反革命那
边的，我们不使他吃亏，就是照我们现在对待资本家的办法。并且，他这一辈子我们都
包到底。资本家也是一辈子包到底。几年定息[5]过后，你得包下去，你得给他工作，
你得给他薪水，你得给他就业，一辈子都包下去。这样一来，农民(占人口的百分之九
十五以上)得到了土地，农民就不恨这些贵族了，仇恨就逐渐解开了。
　　日本有个报纸哇哇叫，讲了一篇，它说，共产党在西藏问题上打了一个大败仗，全
世界都反对共产党。说我们打了大败仗，谁人打了大胜仗呢?总有一个打了大胜仗的吧
。只有人打了大败仗，又没有人打了大胜仗，哪有那种事?你们讲，究竟胜负如何?假定
我们中国人在西藏问题上打了大败仗，那末，谁人打了大胜仗呢?是不是可以说印度干
涉者打了大胜仗?我看也很难说。他打了大胜仗，为什么那么痛哭流涕，如丧考妣呢?你
们看我这个话有一点道理没有?
　　还有个美国人，名字叫艾尔索普，写专栏文章的。他隔那么远，认真地写一篇文章
，说西藏这个地方没有二十万军队是平定不了的，而这二十万军队，每天要一万吨物资
，不可能运这么多去，西藏那个山高得不得了，共产党的军队难得去。因此，他断定叛
乱分子灭不了。叛乱分子灭得了灭不了呀?我看大家都有这个疑问。因为究竟灭得了灭
不了，没有亲临其境，没有打过游击战争的人，是不会知道的。我这里回答:平叛不要
二十万军队，只要五万军队，二十万的四分之一。一九五六年以前我们就五万人(包括
干部)在那里，一九五六年那一年我们撤了三万多，剩下一万多。那个时候我们确实认
真地宣布六年不改革，六年以后，如果还不赞成，我们还可以推迟，是这样讲的[6]。
你们晓得，整个藏族不是一百二十万人，而是三百万人。刚才讲的西藏本部(昌都、前
藏、后藏)是一百二十万人，其他在哪里呢?主要是在四川西部，就是原来西康[7]区域
，以及川西北就是毛儿盖、松潘、阿坝那些地方。这些地方藏族最多。第二是青海，有
五十万人。第三是甘肃南部。第四是云南西北部。这四个区域合计一百八十万人。四川
省人民代表大会开会，商量在藏族地区搞点民主改革，听了一点风，立即就传到原西康
这个区域，一些人就举行武装叛乱。现在青海、甘肃、四川、云南的藏族地区都改革了
，人民武装起来了。藏人扛起枪来，组织自卫武装，非常勇敢。这四个区域能够把叛乱
分子肃清，为什么西藏不能肃清呢?你讲复杂，原西康这个区域是非常复杂的。原西康
的叛乱分子打败了，跑到西藏去了。他们跑到那里，奸淫虏掠，抢得一塌糊涂。他要吃
饭，就得抢，于是同藏人就发生矛盾。原西康跑去的，青海跑去的，有一万多人。一万
多人要不要吃呢?要吃，从哪里来呢?就在一百二十万人中间吃过来吃过去，从去年七月
算起，差不多已经吃了一年了。这回我们把叛乱分子打下来，把他们那些枪收缴了。比
如在日喀则，把那个地方政府武装的枪收缴了，江孜也收缴了，亚东也收缴了。收缴了
枪的地方，群众非常高兴。老百姓怕他们三个东西:第一是怕他那个印，就是怕那个图
章；第二是怕他那个枪；第三，还有一条法鞭，老百姓很怕。把这三者一收，群众皆大
欢喜，非常高兴，帮助我们搬枪枝弹药。西藏的老百姓痛苦得不得了。那里的反动农奴
主对老百姓硬是挖眼，硬是抽筋，甚至把十几岁女孩子的脚骨拿来作乐器，还有拿人的
头骨作饮器喝酒。这样野蛮透顶的叛乱分子完全能够灭掉，不需要二十万军队，只需要
五万军队，可以灭得干干净净。灭掉是不是都杀掉呢?不是。所谓灭掉，并不是把他们
杀掉，而是把他们捉起来教育改造，包括反动派，比如索康[8]那种人。这样的人，跑
出去的，如果他回来，悔过自新，我们不杀他。
　　再讲一个中国人的议论。此人在台湾，名为胡适[9]。他讲，据他看，这个"革命
军"(就是叛乱分子)灭不了。他说，他是徽州人，日本人打中国的时候，占领了安徽，
但是没有去徽州。什么道理呢?徽州山太多了，地形复杂。日本人连徽州的山都不敢去
，西藏那个山共产党敢去?我说，胡适这个方法论就不对，他那个"大胆假设"是危险
的。他大胆假设，他推理，说徽州山小，日本人尚且不敢去，那末西藏的山大得多、高
得多，共产党难道敢去吗?因此结论:共产党一定不敢去，共产党灭不了那个地方的叛乱
武装。现在要批评胡适这个方法论，我看他是要输的，他并不"小心求证"，只有"大
胆假设"。
　　有些人，像印度资产阶级中的一些人，又不同一点，他们有两面性。他们一方面非
常不高兴，非常反对我们三月二十日以后开始的坚决镇压叛乱，非常反对我们这种政策
，他们同情叛乱分子。另一方面，又不愿意跟我们闹翻，他们想到过去几千年中国跟印
度都没有闹翻过，没有战争，同时，他们看到无可奈何花落去，花已经落去了。一九五
四年中印两国订了条约[10]，就是声明五项原则的那个条约，他们承认西藏是中国的一
部分，是中国的领土。他们留了一手，不做绝。英国人最鬼，英国外交大臣劳埃德，工
党议员这个一问，那个一问，他总是一问三不知，说:没有消息，我们英国跟西藏没有
接触，在那里没有人员，因此我无可奉告。老是这么讲。他还说，要等西藏那个人出来
以后，看他怎么样，我们才说话。他的意思就是达赖出来后，看他说什么话。中国共产
党并没有关死门，说达赖是被挟持走的，又发表了他的三封信[11]。这次人民代表大会
，周总理的报告[12]里头要讲这件事。我们希望达赖回来，还建议这次选举不仅选班禅
，而且要选达赖。他是个年轻人，现在还只有二十五岁。假如他活到八十五岁，从现在
算起还有六十年，那个时候二十一世纪了，世界会怎么样呀?要变的。那个时候，我相
信他会回来的。他五十九年不回来，第六十年他有可能回来。那时候世界都变了。这里
是他的父母之邦，生于斯，长于斯，现在到外国，仰人鼻息，几根枪都缴了。我们采取
这个态度比较主动，不做绝了。
　　总理的报告里头要讲希望达赖回国。如果他愿意回国，能够摆脱那些反动分子，我
们希望他回国。但是，事实上看来他现在难于回国。他脱离不了那一堆人。同时，他本
人那个情绪，上一次到印度他就不想回来的，而班禅是要回来的。那时，总理劝解，可
能还有尼赫鲁[13]劝解，与其不回不如回。那个时候就跟他这么讲:你到印度有什么作
用?不过是当一个寓公，就在那里吃饭，脱离群众，脱离祖国的土地和人民。现在，还
看不见他有改革的决心。说他要改革，站在人民这方面，站在劳动人民这方面，看来不
是的。他那个世界观是不是能改变?六十年以后也许能改，也许不要六十年。而现在看
来，一下子要他回来也难。他如果是想回来，明天回来都可以，但是他得进行改革，得
平息叛乱，就是要完全站在我们这方面来。看来，他事实上一下子也很难。但是，我们
文章不做绝了。
　　根据中央档案馆保存的谈话记录稿刊印。


　　注释
　　[1]这是毛泽东在第十六次最高国务会议上的讲话中关于西藏问题的部分。一九五
九年三月十日，西藏上层反动集团在外国势力支持下，蓄意破坏《关于和平解放西藏办
法的协议》的实行，公开宣布"西藏独立"。十七日，达赖喇嘛逃往印度。十九日，叛
乱分子发动对人民解放军驻拉萨部队和中央代表机关的全面进攻。中国人民解放军驻藏
部队于二十日对拉萨叛乱武装实施反击，并相继平息了其他地区的武装叛乱，维护了国
家统一和民族团结。
　　[2]班禅，即班禅额尔德尼·确吉坚赞（一九三八——一九八九），青海循化人。
原西藏地方宗教和政治领袖之一。当时任政协全国委员会副主席、西藏自治区筹备委员
会代理主任委员。
　　[3]阿沛，即阿沛·阿旺晋美，一九一一年生，西藏拉萨人。当时任西藏自治区筹
备委员会副主任委员兼秘书长。
　　[4]达赖，即达赖喇嘛·丹增嘉措，一九三五年生，青海湟中人。原西藏地方宗教
和政治领袖之一。曾任全国人大常委会副委员长、西藏自治区筹备委员会主任委员、中
国佛教协会名誉会长。一九五九年西藏上层反动集团发动武装叛乱时逃往印度。
　　[5]定息，是我国在资本主义工商业实行全行业公私合营后，对民族资本家的生产
资料进行赎买的一种形式，即不论企业盈亏，统一由国家每年按照合营时清产核资确定
的私股股额，发给资本家固定的利息（一般是年息百分之五）。从一九五六年起支付定
息。一九六六年九月停止支付。
　　[6]一九五六年十二月三十日，周恩来在同达赖喇嘛的谈话中说，毛泽东主席让我
告诉你，可以肯定，在第二个五年计划以内根本不谈改革；过六年之后，如可以改的话
，仍然由西藏地方政府根据那时的情况和条件决定。
　　[7]西康，即西康省，一九五五年撤销。撤销时，原辖区划归四川省。
　　[8]索康，即索康·旺清格勒，曾任西藏自治区筹备委员会委员。一九五九年西藏
上层反动集团武装叛乱的策动者之一。
　　[9]胡适（一八九一——一九六二），字适之，安徽绩溪人。一九一九年发表《多
研究些问题，少谈些"主义"》一文，反对马克思主义的传播，还提出"大胆假设，小
心求证"的研究方法。一九四八年去美国，后到台湾。
　　[10]一九五四年四月二十九日，中国和印度两国政府在北京签订了《中印关于中国
西藏地方和印度之间的通商和交通协定》。协定明确以和平共处五项原则为指导两国关
系的准则，并以此确定了促进中国西藏地方和印度之间的通商贸易及便利两国人民互相
朝圣往来的各项具体办法。主要内容是：双方互设商务代理处；双方商人、香客在指定
地点进行贸易和按惯例朝圣，并经一定山口、道路往来；关于两国外交、公务人员及国
民过境事宜的规定等。协定一九五四年六月三日生效，有效期八年，一九六二年六月期
满失效。
　　[11]指《人民日报》一九五九年三月三十日发表的达赖喇嘛三月十一日、十二日、
十六日先后写给中央驻西藏代理代表、西藏军区政治委员谭冠三的三封信。三月十一日
的信中说："昨天我决定去军区看戏，但由于少数坏人的煽动，而僧俗人民不解真相追
随其后，进行阻拦，确实无法去访，使我害羞难言，忧虑交加，而处于莫知所措的境地
。"又说："反动的坏分子们正在借口保护我的安全而进行着危害我的活动。"三月十
二日的信中说："对于昨天、前天发生的、以保护我的安全为名而制造的严重离间中央
与地方关系的事件，我正尽一切可能设法处理。"三月十六日的信中说："现在此间内
外的情况虽然仍很难处置，但我正在用巧妙的办法，在政府官员中从内部划分进步与反
对革命的两种人的界线。一旦几天之后，有了一定数量的足以信赖的力量之后，将采取
秘密的方式前往军区。"
　　[12]指周恩来总理即将向第二届全国人民代表大会第一次会议作的《政府工作报告
》。
　　[13]尼赫鲁（一八八九——一九六四），当时任印度总理。

A Cold War in Shangri La - The CIA in Tibet

Wednesday 26 December 2007 by Tenzing Sonam

(First published in Man's World, India, September 2000)

March 1959. A suburban house outside Washington, D.C. Two men - an American
and an oriental-looking monk - keep vigil beside a wireless receiver.
Meanwhile, thousands of miles away in Tibet, a tense drama is unfolding: the
Dalai Lama, disguised in layman's clothes, has escaped from his summer
palace and is believed to be heading south for the Indian border. The
Chinese military command in Lhasa discovers his disappearance only three
days later. Crack troops from the People's Liberation Army set out in hot
pursuit across the uncharted terrain of the Tibetan plateau. The news breaks
the international headlines and the world waits with bated breath to find
out whether or not the young "God King" will make it safely across the great
Himalayan barrier. This is one of the escape stories of the century.

Early morning in Washington, D.C. The wireless finally spits out the dots
and dashes the two men have been waiting for. Using a special dictionary,
the monk laboriously translates the Morse Coded message from Tibetan into
English. Finally, he passes the paper to the American. It says something
like, "Contact established with the Dalai Lama. He is safe and well." The
two men whoop with joy.

The monk was Geshe Wangyal, a learned Buddhist teacher from the ethnic
republic of Kalmykia in southern Russia who had lived and studied for many
years in one of the great monasteries of Lhasa before making his way to
America. His companion was John Greaney, a young CIA officer assigned to a
covert operation dealing with Tibet, code-named ST Circus. And so it was
that long before the waiting world had any idea about the Dalai Lama's fate
, the CIA was in radio contact with his escape party. But how did this come
about - this weird and implausible collision between an ancient and
enigmatic civilization and the shadowy world of the CIA? For how long did
this relationship continue and what was its ultimate outcome?

In late 1949, shortly after the Communist takeover of China, the People's
Liberation Army invaded Tibet. Tibet's tiny army was quickly defeated and
by the summer of 1951, Chinese troops were marching into the capital, Lhasa.
The 17-year-old Dalai Lama, Tibet's temporal and spiritual leader, was
forced to come to terms with the Chinese. Throughout the fifties, Chinese
soldiers continued to pour into Tibet. In Lhasa, the government maintained
an uneasy coexistence with the occupying forces but in the outlying
provinces of Kham and Amdo, the Chinese began to impose communist reforms.
The very essence of Tibetan life - Buddhism - came under threat. In 1956,
the siege and bombing of Lithang Monastery in Kham, sparked the revolt that
had been waiting to erupt. Khampa tribesmen, known for their martial
character, took to the hills and started a guerrilla campaign.

News of the rebellion spread to Lhasa where Andrug Gompo Tashi, a well-known
Khampa trader living in the capital, started an underground organization
called Chu Shi Gang Drug, Four Rivers Six Ranges. Gompo Tashi sent a small
group of men to India to explore the possibilities of getting military
support from foreign countries and organizations. Their destination was
Kalimpong, a thriving frontier town, then the most important trade post
between India and Tibet and the centre of the emigrè Tibetan world. The
Dalai Lama's elder brother, Gyalo Thondup, had been living here since the
early fifties and was actively engaged in promoting the Tibetan cause. He
had already been approached by the CIA, which was keen to find ways of
supporting the dissident Tibetan movement as part of its global anti-
communist campaign.

Gompo Tashi's men went to meet Gyalo Thondup who recalls the meeting, "They
came to me seeking help. I couldn't provide any help except my verbal
sympathy. Then they asked me to approach, on their behalf, people I knew in
the American government. It all started like this." The American response
was encouraging. Gompo Tashi's men couldn't have been more excited. They
had heard of America, mainly through communist propaganda, which constantly
decried the country as China's greatest enemy. Now this very country was
coming to their aid. Six men were selected from Gompo Tashi's group and
told be ready to go on a secret mission, the exact nature of which was not
revealed.

One night, Gyalo Thondup drove the six men down to the plains, past the town
of Siliguri. After some time, they reached the end of a road. Using a
compass, he then led them across fields until they came to a large river.
Here, he turned back after entrusting them in the care of his assistant.
They made a hazardous river crossing. On the other side, a group of soldiers
was waiting for them. The men were driven a short distance to a hut where
an American - the first white man they had ever seen - greeted them warmly.
From here they were taken by car and then by train, heavily guarded in a
sealed compartment, to a small airstrip where an unmarked transport plane -
a wondrous new sight - awaited them. They did not know it but they were on
the outskirts of Dhaka. They flew for what seemed like an eternity, over
thick tropical jungles and unimagined expanses of water, stopping only to
refuel, until at last they landed at their destination - a small palm-
fringed island in the middle of nowhere. The men stumbled out, airsick,
dazed and bewildered. They were in Saipan in the South Pacific, as far away
from their high mountain homeland as they could possibly be.

Their instructor was a former Marine, Roger McCarthy. "I was in Saipan in
March of '57," he recollects, "when we got the cable from headquarters,
from Washington, which said that there was going to be a Tibetan group
coming to Saipan for training, without too much more information, other than
that they wanted across-the-board training and that the people in the group
were supposed to be able to communicate once they went back into Tibet,
which meant, of course, clandestine radio." For the next several months,
under his tutelage, the men were trained in the techniques of modern warfare
and espionage, in the use of weapons and explosives, but most of all, in
the operation of the hand-cranked radio transmitter and receiver. Since the
Tibetans could not read or write English, a special telecode book was
created in which Tibetan words and phrases were encoded into numbered code
groups. This became the basis for the Morse Code messages they would send
and receive from Tibet. At the end of their training the men were flown back
to East Pakistan.

One full moon night in September 1957, they took off in a modified B-17
aeroplane from the same airstrip near Dhaka. Before long they were flying
over the Himalayan range, its peaks gleaming in the clear night sky. Athar
Norbu and his partner, Lhotse, were the first to jump, their target a wide
sandbar in the Tsangpo river close to Samye Monastery in Central Tibet. He
can still recall the excitement of that moment: "The Tsangpo appeared below
us. We could see it gleaming in the dark. There were no clouds, it was a
clear night. A feeling of happiness surged through me when I realized that
we would be able to make the jump. The plane descended and at the signal '
Go!' we went rattling out of the plane." Their mission was to proceed to
Lhasa and make contact with Andrug Gompo Tashi and, if possible, to meet the
Dalai Lama.

In Washington, DC, their first radio message was awaited with eager
anticipation. An operation of this nature, involving as it did, numerous
logistical challenges, was audacious even by CIA standards: parachutes had
to be modified to accommodate the high altitude; the pilots flying the B-17s
had only old turn-of-the-century British maps to navigate with (the CIA
would later map Tibet using the U-2 spy plane); a certain type of gold coin
then favoured in Tibet had to be found for the men to take back with them (
the bazaars of the Far East were scoured); even the Kellog cereal company
was roped in to produce tsampa, the roasted barley flour that is a staple in
Tibet. Ken Knaus, Roger McCarthy's successor as head of ST Circus, was at
the CIA's old headquarters in the capital when the message finally arrived.
"I suppose you could have heard the cheers from one end to the other when
that first message came in saying that the guys had arrived and they were
safe," he says, smiling at the memory of that moment. "Yeah, that was indeed
a time for celebration. It's a pretty incredible achievement to think of,
you know...here you are, what? 15,000 miles away, message going out, guy
sitting out there with a hand cranked generator spinning this stuff out,
spinning through the air, and somehow it gets back here on a piece of paper!"

The remaining four men from the pilot group were not so lucky. Three of them
, under the leadership of Gyato Wangdu, were dropped near Lithang where they
linked up with a large guerrilla force. The fourth man went in by land but
was killed before he could join his companions. Before the CIA could send
any help, the force came under heavy attack from Chinese reinforcements.
Wangdu's team mates were both killed in the fighting and he himself only
just managed to escape, making his way under incredibly harsh conditions
across the desolate Jangthang plain before crossing safely into India.

In Lhasa, Athar Norbu and Lhotse made contact with Gompo Tashi. Their
efforts to meet the Dalai Lama were unsuccessful. In the summer of 1958,
Gompo Tashi moved out of Lhasa to set up his headquarters at a place called
Driguthang, in southern Tibet, where thousands of men had gathered. There,
they renamed their pan-Tibetan movement, Tensung Dhanglang Magar, the
Voluntary Force for the Defence of Buddhism. The two radio operators were on
hand to witness the inaugural ceremony and reported back to the Americans.
The CIA was now ready to send arms to the resistance. On a full moon night
in late summer, they made their first drop, a consignment comprising mostly
of old Lee Enfield rifles, which could not be traced back to them.

In early 1958, a second group of men was selected for training. Once again,
they made the clandestine crossing into East Pakistan before being flown to
a training camp, this time in Virginia in America itself. Among them was
Lhamo Tsering, Gyalo Thondup's right-hand man, who would later head the
operations out of India. Buoyed by the success of the two radio operators in
Central Tibet, the CIA was now keen to step up its involvement. A top
secret training facility was built at Camp Hale, a disused World War Two
military base high in the Colorado Rocky Mountains. A story was circulated
in the local press that Camp Hale was to be the site of atomic tests and
would be a high security zone. The entire area was cordoned off and its
perimeters patrolled by military police. The Tibetans immediately fell in
love with the place, which, with its high mountains, thick forests and
alpine meadows, reminded them of their home. They nicknamed the camp, Dhumra
- "The Garden".

In Tibet, the CIA made a second arms drop to Gompo Tashi's men. The
guerrillas had mounted a fierce campaign and were in control of a large
swathe of southern Tibet. By the beginning of 1959, the fragile coexistence
between the Dalai Lama's government and the Chinese occupying forces was
threatening to unravel. Matters came to a head in March, when a rumour
circulated around Lhasa that the Chinese commander had invited the Dalai
Lama to attend a theatrical performance at the military headquarters but
that he was to come unaccompanied by any of his bodyguards. The people of
Lhasa were convinced that this was a plot to kidnap their young leader.
Before long, thousands had converged upon the Dalai Lama's summer palace,
the Norbulingka, determined to physically prevent him from leaving. The
Dalai Lama was caught in a quandary. The very thing he had feared most of
all and tried hard to prevent, bloodshed and violence, now seemed imminent.
The decision to escape was made when the Chinese unexpectedly fired two
shells at the Norbulingka.

Resistance fighters escorted the Dalai Lama through guerrilla-held territory
. The two CIA-trained men met up with the escape party halfway on their
journey and accompanied them to the Indian border, keeping the Americans
updated about their progress. The Dalai Lama's escape triggered a massive
military operation by the Chinese who brutally quelled the revolt in Lhasa
and went on the offensive against the resistance bases in southern Tibet.
The guerrillas suffered major setbacks. Andrug Gompo Tashi and the remainder
of his force had no choice but to join the exodus of Tibetans who were
streaming across the Himalaya, following their leader into exile.

The fall of Lhasa and the Dalai Lama's escape spurred the CIA to expand the
scope of their involvement. More groups of men were brought to Camp Hale.
By the time the camp ceased to function in October 1964, some 259 Tibetans
had been trained there. The Tibetans proved to be diligent students and
impressed their instructors with their quick intelligence, ready humour and
natural martial skills. A close relationship developed between them and
their American instructors, one that was based on mutual respect and a
strange sense of shared "frontier" values. The Americans were known only by
their first names - Mr Don, Mr Zeke, Mr Tony, and so on. They were mostly
tough former soldiers, men who would later go on to more harrowing and
dubious operations in Southeast Asia and who would recall their time with
the Tibetans as the one shining highpoint of their careers.

Although it was never the official American policy, the Tibetans were led to
believe - and perhaps their American mentors came to believe it themselves
- that they were being trained for the fight to regain Tibet's independence
. Thinley Paljor, who worked as an interpreter at Camp Hale, recalls, "
During the training period, we learned that the objective of our training
was to gain our independence. In our games-room we had a picture of
Eisenhower, signed by him, 'to my fellow Tibetan friends, from Eisenhower'
. So we thought that even the president himself was giving us support." But
Sam Halpern, a senior CIA officer at the time, has no illusions about what
the aim of ST Circus was: "I think basically the whole idea was to keep the
Chinese occupied somehow...keep them annoyed...keep them disturbed. Nobody
wanted to go to war over Tibet, that's pretty clear. I would think that
from the American point of view it wasn't going to cost us very much,
either money or manpower. Anyway it wasn't our manpower involved, it was
the Tibetan manpower, and we would be willing to help the Tibetans become a
running sore and a nuisance to the Chinese."

Between late 1959 and January 1960, the CIA parachuted four separate groups
of Camp Hale trainees into Tibet to make contact with what was left of the
resistance. Each team carried with them wireless sets and weapons for their
own use. Each member had a cyanide capsule strapped around his wrist; they
could choose to kill themselves rather than be captured alive. The first
team was dropped in September 1959 at a place close to the great inland lake
of Namtso, north of Lhasa. On landing, they discovered that the guerrilla
force they were sent to contact had already been destroyed by the Chinese.
They escaped back to India through Nepal.

Around the same time, another group of 18 men was dropped at a place called
Chagra Pembar, northeast of Lhasa, where a huge group of resistance fighters
, along with their families and livestock, had gathered. The CIA made an
arms drop soon afterwards. Unlike before, the weapons were now American,
mostly M-1 rifles but also mortars, recoilless rifles, machine guns and
grenades. After the Dalai Lama's escape, there was less concern about
maintaining the "plausible deniability" that had determined the composition
of the earlier arms drops. According to plan, five of the Camp Hale trainees
left Chagra Pembar after the drop and headed north where they linked up
with yet another large rebel force, based in a desolate area called Nira
Tsogo. This gathering was also made up of families and animals and resembled
a medieval encampment rather than a guerrilla force on the move. The team
radioed for more support. In response, three more teams, totalling 16 men
were parachuted at Nira Tsogo and several arms drops were made, both here
and at Chagra Pembar. By now, the numbers of people concentrated in these
two places had swollen to huge proportions as more and more escaping
families joined them. The CIA frantically gave instructions to its men to
convince the leaders of the various groups to break up into smaller outfits
and fan out so that they would be less vulnerable to attack, but this did
not happen. It was only a matter of time before they were discovered.

One of the fighters at Chagra Pembar, Dechen, clearly remembers when the
first Chinese planes flew overhead: "Then one day, the Chinese surrounded us
. A Chinese aeroplane came in the morning and dropped leaflets which told us
to surrender and warned us not to listen to the 'imperialist' Americans
because nothing good would come of it. After that, every day, some fifteen
jets came. They came in groups of five, in the morning, at midday and at 3
or 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Each jet carried fifteen to twenty bombs. We
were in the high plains so there was nowhere to hide. The five jets made
quick rounds and killed animals and men. We suffered huge casualties."
Thousands of men, women and children were killed, both at Chagra Pembar and
Nira Tsogo, in the aerial bombings and artillery barrages that followed. Of
the parachute teams, only five men managed to escape and reach India safely.
The rest perished, either during the fighting or afterwards, while on the
run.

The last of the missions inside Tibet was made in January 1960. A seven-man
team was parachuted into Markham in eastern Tibet. The team was led by Yeshe
Wangyal, who had already been on the first unsuccessful mission to Namtso.
Wangyal's father, a chieftan of the area, was reported to be heading a
resistance group but once on the ground the men learnt that he had already
been killed. Wangyal and his men managed to link up with the remnants of his
father's force but from the very beginning, they came under attack from
the Chinese. For days, they fought running battles, dogged by an ever-
increasing army of Chinese troops until one morning they were surrounded
from all sides. They prepared for the last stand, each man ready to fight
till the death.

The only survivor of that team, Bhusang, remembers the intensity of that
last battle: "Then the whole mountainside was swarming with Chinese. We
fought them nine times. We suffered our heaviest casualties that day. During
the battle, the Chinese would shout out to us, 'Surrender! Surrender!' We
shouted back, 'Eat shit!' I swear, we said, 'Eat shit! You invaded our
country, what do you mean by surrender?' We shot at them instead. We really
fought. It was intense, like a dream, it didn't seem real. And then, at
around 10 o'clock, I looked around and saw that two men from our team had
taken their cyanide capsules and were dead. It was the end. I put the
capsule in my mouth because later I might not have had time." But before he
could bite into the capsule, Bhusang was knocked unconscious from behind and
taken prisoner. Wangyal and the others in his team were all dead. Bhusang
would spend the next 20 years in a Chinese prison.

After Andrug Gompo Tashi's arrival in India in 1959, he and Gyalo Thondup
immediately drew up plans to find a new base of operations from which to
launch a new front. They decided on Mustang, a remote and barren kingdom in
northern Nepal that juts into Tibet. The CIA agreed to help them and the
initial plan was to send a total of 2100 men in groups of 300. Mustang would
be the staging post from where these groups would move into Tibet and set
up bases. The CIA demanded the highest security as the movement of such
large numbers of men would be sure to arouse the suspicion of both the
Indian and Nepalese authorities. Gompo Tashi selected one of his lieutenants
, an ex-monk named Bapa Yeshe, to be in charge of the operations.

In June 1960, Yeshe, along with an advance party, which included a 2-man
radio team, made their way to Mustang. The majority of resistance fighters
who had escaped from Tibet were now working on road camps in Sikkim. The
first group of 300 was selected and gathered in Darjeeling where Lhamo
Tsering had now set up the operational headquarters. From here they were
sent on to Mustang. The plan went without a hitch, but soon rumours began to
circulate among the road-workers that a new resistance army was in the
process of being raised. Hundreds of men left the road camps and made their
way to Darjeeling until their mysterious migration from Sikkim attracted the
attention of the newspapers. The CIA, unhappy with this turn of events,
withdrew support. Soon, more than 2000 men had gathered in Mustang, where
Yeshe had neither the resources nor the supplies to support them. The
situation became dire as winter approached. The men were reduced to boiling
their leather shoes and saddlebags for sustenance. Several froze to death.
But somehow, the hope that they would soon have the opportunity to go back
to Tibet and fight their enemy kept their spirits up.

In March 1961, the CIA finally resumed aid by making an arms drop to the
Mustang force. Seven Camp Hale trainees jumped in with the supplies. Several
more came overland. Having sent arms, the CIA now wanted to see results and
the Mustang force would not disappoint them. A series of raids was
conducted along the strategic Sinkiang-Tibet highway that looped through
southwestern Tibet, close to the Mustang border, on its way to Lhasa. One
such raid, led by a Camp Hale alumnus, resulted in a gold mine of
intelligence. A small military convoy was ambushed and its occupants, which
included a high-ranking military officer, were killed. Among their effects
was a blue satchel full of documents. This was retrieved and carried back to
base and then sent by courier to Darjeeling, from where Lhamo Tsering
passed it on to his CIA contact person (once a month, he would go to
Calcutta where, in classic cloak-and-dagger fashion, he would meet his
American counterpart in a secret rendezvous, either in a moving car or in a
safe house).

When the documents arrived in Washington, the CIA couldn't believe its luck
. Among other things, they provided the US intelligence community with its
first hard evidence of the failure of Mao's Great Leap Forward. Ken Knaus
states categorically: "The Tibetan Document Raid was one of the greatest
intelligence hauls in the history of the Agency. Here was an actual product
of these operations that could be a demonstrable one, that was of benefit to
the US Government. So that was of great help as far as getting or
maintaining support for these kinds of operations was concerned." A second
arms drop was made in December of that year in Mustang. From 1961 until 1964
, numerous raids were carried out inside Tibet until the Sinkiang-Tibet
Highway became virtually unusable. The Chinese were forced to build a detour
further away from the border.

Following the debacle of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, Nehru turned for help
to America, which responded swiftly. A number of joint operations was
initiated, some involving Tibetan refugees. The Indians were apprised of the
Mustang guerrilla force, which, until then, was being run secretly out of
the Darjeeling office. It was now brought under the control of a Combined
Operations Centre in New Delhi, and run jointly by an American, Indian and
Tibetan representative. The CIA continued to finance the guerrillas and
provide them with arms and equipment and training at Camp Hale (they no
longer had to take the circuitous route via East Pakistan; US transport
planes flew them directly out of an Air Force base in north India), but the
Indians now had a strong say in the nature and direction of operations.

The CIA made its final arms drop in May 1965, but by now the guerrillas were
being instructed to cease making armed incursions inside Tibet and to limit
their operations to intelligence gathering. The guerrillas ignored their
orders and continued making raids until the late sixties. By then, however,
there was internal trouble brewing within the organization itself. For a
number of years there had been some discontent, particularly among the Camp
Hale trainees who held key positions in the force, about Yeshe's style of
leadership, which was more in the traditional mould of a tribal chieftain
than a modern-day guerrilla commander. In 1968, misgivings about the way
Yeshe was handling the finances led to a tense confrontation between him and
his deputies. The CIA had never been happy about the selection of Yeshe as
commander of the Mustang force but, as Gompo Tashi's nominee, they had
little choice. Now, with Gompo Tashi dead - he had passed away in 1964 - it
applied renewed pressure to get rid of Yeshe. He was finally replaced by
Gyato Wangdu, the same man who had been trained on Saipan and parachuted
into eastern Tibet in 1957.

In late 1968, Gyalo Thondup was unexpectedly informed by the CIA that it was
pulling out of its Tibetan operations. The agency would provide funding for
another three years, which would give the Mustang organization time to
retrench and resettle the guerrillas. No explanations were given but it was
becoming obvious in Washington that the Tibetans had long outlived their
usefulness. Besides, secret rapprochement talks were already underway
between America and China and the last thing the Americans needed was an
aging guerrilla army under their patronage in the Himalayas. Gyalo Thondup
saw the pullout as a complete betrayal. "The Americans had given me verbal
assurances," he says, "stating that if the Dalai Lama came to India, they
would support Tibet's struggle for independence until Tibet regained
independence." Lhamo Tsering and Wangdu were in Mustang when the news was
delivered to them. They were devastated, coming as it did, at the height of
the crisis over Bapa Yeshe. Fearing that the news would demoralize the men
they decided to keep it a secret.

Under Wangdu's leadership, the Mustang force continued for a few more years
, supported to a much lesser extent by India, although most guerrilla
activities were now suspended and plans were put into motion to rehabilitate
the force. Then, in the summer of 1974, the Nepalese government - acting
under pressure from China, which, by now, had become a close ally - decided
to crack down on the organization. It sent in its troops and demanded the
surrender of the guerrillas. Lhamo Tsering, who was in Pokhara at the time,
was arrested and used as a bargaining chip but the guerrillas were in no
mood to comply. They decided to hold out against the Nepalese and prepared
for battle. The stage was set for a major confrontation but before matters
escalated further, an emissary of the Dalai Lama arrived, carrying a tape
recorded message. The message was played at each of the guerrilla camps. The
men couldn't believe their ears. The voice of their sacred leader floated
down from the makeshift loudspeakers appealing to them to lay down their
weapons and prevent unnecessary bloodshed. Ugyen Tashi, one of the foot
soldiers at Mustang, remembers that moment, "The tape contained the Dalai
Lama's real voice. So when we heard his message, I swear, some of the men
even cried. Everyone heard the message with their own ears so we had no
choice but to give up. Then we turned in our weapons...all day and all night
." One of their leaders, Pachen, cut his own throat rather than face the
humiliation of surrender. A number of men threw themselves into a river and
were drowned.

Wangdu, convinced that the Nepalese would imprison him after the surrender,
made a run for the Indian border with a few select men. Hotly pursued by
Nepalese troops, they ended up crisscrossing back and forth between Nepal
and Tibet for nearly a month until they were within striking distance of the
Indian frontier. At a place called Tinker Pass, Wangdu's men sent him
ahead with a small escort while they dug themselves in to hold the rear but,
in doing so, they unwittingly sent their leader into a trap. Nepalese
soldiers ambushed the advance party close to the pass and Wangdu and his men
were gunned down in a murderous crossfire. The remaining guerrillas fought
their way out and most of them managed to cross over into India. Lhamo
Tsering and six other men were incarcerated in Kathmandu where they would
spend the next eight years in prison. Tibet's armed struggle against the
Chinese occupation had come to an ignominious close.

Four decades after the CIA first got involved in Tibet, Roger McCarthy looks
back and sums up its outcome: "Unfortunately our history as a government
has more sad stories and sad endings than it does have good stories with
good endings. Generally speaking, I think the Agency looks at Tibet as
having been one of the best operations that it has run. Well that's fine,
that's very complementary, but however, look at the final results. That's
a very sad commentary. If we look at what we did to Tibet as about the best
that we could do, then I say that we have failed...miserably."

Camp Hale, between Red Cliff and Leadville in the Eagle River valley in
Colorado, was a United States Army training facility constructed in 1942 for
what became the 10th Mountain Division. It was named in honor of General
Irving Hale. Soldiers were trained in mountain climbing, skiing and cold-
weather survival. When it was in full operation, approximately 16,000
soldiers were housed there.

From 1959 to 1964, Tibetan guerrillas were secretly trained at Camp Hale by
the CIA. The site was chosen because of the similarities of the Rocky
Mountains with the Himalayan Plateau. The Tibetans loved the surroundings so
much that they nicknamed the camp, "Dhumra", the Garden. The CIA circulated
a story in the local press that Camp Hale was to be the site of atomic
tests and would be a high security zone. Until its closure in 1964, the
entire area was cordoned off and its perimeter patrolled by military police.
In the nearby mining town of Leadville, where instructors from Camp Hale
occasionally went for rest and recreation, numerous rumors spread about the
camp but no one guessed its real function.

The Tibetan project was codenamed ST Circus, and it was similar to the CIA
operation that trained dissident Cubans in what later became the Bay of Pigs
Invasion. In all, around 259 Tibetans were trained at Camp Hale. Some were
parachuted back into Tibet to link up with local resistance groups (most
perished); others were sent overland into Tibet on intelligence gathering
missions; and yet others were instrumental in setting up the CIA-funded
Tibetan resistance force that operated out of Mustang, in northern Nepal (
1959-1974). After Camp Hale was dismantled in 1964, no Tibetans remained in
Colorado.

From 1958 to 1960 Anthony Poshepny trained various special missions teams,
including Tibetan Khambas and Hui Muslims, for operations in China against
the Communist government. Poshepny sometimes claimed that he personally
escorted the 14th Dalai Lama out of Tibet, but this has been denied, both by
former CIA officers involved in the Tibet operation, and by the Tibetan
Government-in-exile (Central Tibetan Administration).

In 1964, Camp Hale was dismantled and the land was deeded to the United
States Forest Service. Since 1974 the area has reflected its roots by
becoming a youth development training center. The Eagle County non-profit,
Meet The Wilderness,[1], has effectively used the site to expose
disadvantaged youth to many of the same outdoor challenges experienced by
the 10th Mountain Division. In 2003, there was a cleanup effort to remove
some of the unexploded ordnance at the site.
--
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